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ABSTRACT 
The broad aim of this study is to investigate and recommend a 
model which would contribute to finding a solution to the AIDS 
pandemic facing the insurance industry. At present HIV 
positive persons are excluded from obtaining life insurance, and 
as a result of this they are excluded from obtaining access to 
finance as a life insurance policy is a vital financial instrument 
when attempting to access finance. 
The insurance industry has decided to protect itself and its 
response to the pandemic smacks of crisis intervention rather 
an attempt to find a solution acceptable to all parties. The 
intention is to investigate the role that all stakeholders, the 
public sector, the state and the industry can play in contributing 
to an imaginative response posed by this challenge. 
This study explores the causes and prognosis of AIDS, how the 
life insurance industry operates, how necessary life insurance 
is, strategies adopted by the industry in the face of this 
challenge, the experience of international insurers, as well as 
suggesting possible solutions and examining their mechanics. 
The study also investigates the impact of the Constitution and 
the Fundamental Rights on the suggested solutions. It 
recommends a particular solution as a workable model within a 
social policy perspective. It concludes with a request that all 
stakeholders participate in this solution for and to the benefit of 
everyone, as AIDS is not the problem of medical practitioners, 
or attorneys, or the insurance industry, but a societal problem. 
CHAPTER ONE 
AN OVERVIEW 
1.1 THE EXTENT OF THE PROBLEM 
The South African Insurance Industry continues to sketch a dismal picture regarding the 
issue of AIDS, and specifically how the industry has and intends to deal with the AIDS 
challenge facing it. Whilst this picture is bleaker than that of overseas companies, who are 
now questioning their doomsday predictions, the statistics on AIDS in South Africa can 
help us understand the concerns within the industry. 
According to statistics released by the Department of National Health and Population 
Development (DNHPD), an estimated 566 000 South Africans were IIlV positive at the 
end of 1993 .1 This means that 4 7 out of every 1 000 sexually active persons are IIlV 
positive. It is estimated that by the year 2000 South Africa will have between 3, 7 million 
and 4, 1 million HIV positive persons, and that this will have increase~ to between 18% and 
30% of the population by the year 2005. The number of deaths due to AIDS will have 
reached 2,3 million, and approximately 500 000 children will be orphaned due to AIDS.2 
In an address to the Senate, the Minister of Health, Dr Nkosaz.ana Zuma, stated the 
following: 
'Aids is the major threat, not only to our health services but to 
our economy and our country as a whole. ' 3 
• 
The above statement is echoed by an insurance industry spokesperson who warns that: 
1 Argus March 30, 1994 at 1 
2Finansies en Tegniek May 7, 1994 
3 Argus September 2, 1994 at 1 
2 
'The AIDS epidemic in Africa and the Third World is still 
spreading relentlessly. 14 
In order to combat this threat, the Ministry of Health has adopted a R257 million, two year 
national plan to fight AIDS. The plan has three broad goals, namely (1) to prevent the 
spread of AIDS; (2) to reduce the impact of the disease; and (3) to mobilise local, national 
and international resources to combat AIDS. 5 However, as a result of the various 
competing interests for a slice of the national budget, the Department of Health would only 
be able to contribute R120 million of the required R257 million, and the government 
would look to big business, private funders and agencies such as the World Health 
Organisation to make up the shortfall. 
1.2 SOUTH AFRlCA - A DEVELOPING COUNTRY 
South Africa is a diverse country in a range of aspects. In terms of development there are 
stark contrasts. The majority of the population live in dire poverty, which exists in tandem 
with modem cities and an advanced technological and commercial framework. Thus, 
synonymous with South African society is the vast discrepancy between rich and poor. 
4'Sanlam warns: Don't underestimate the HIV risk' in African Insurance and Finance 
Record May/June 1994 at 12 
5 Argus July 22, 1994 at 6 
3 
It ahnost goes without saying that the segregation in all areas of society has had dire 
consequences. South Africans have now to find creative ways to solve problems in the 
economic, sociaL politicaL moral, cultural and environmental spheres of society. 6 
It has been well documented that AIDS and poverty, and obviously apartheid are closely 
linked. 7 Structures such as the migrant labour system, overcrowded single-sex hostels and 
other such structures which were necessary to entrench the apartheid policies of the 
National Party have left us with malnourished children, a low level of literacy and poor 
primary health care services. All these factors contribute to the spread ofIDV and AIDS.8 
The economically disadvantaged are, therefore, the people most affected and afflicted by 
IDV and AIDS. In South Africa black rural women are the most oppressed sector of the 
community. 9 It is therefore clear that in South Africa the people who, are and most likely 
will be, the victims of AIDS will be the black population in general and black women in 
particular. 10 
The black population will be the sector most affected by policies relating to AIDS. It could 
be argued that there is a link between persons seeking life insurance and rising standards of 
living and education. The five key policy programmes contained in the RDP are, namely, 
meeting basic needs; developing human resources; building the economy; democratising 
6 Ibid at 1-13 
7 C Evian 'The socio-economic determinants of the AIDS epidemic in South Africa - a 
cycle of poverty' in (83) South African Medical Journal Sept 1993 p635 at p 635 
81 Toms 'The Medical Nature of AIDS -A Developing <;::ountry's Experience oflli Health 
Patterns Affecting Employment' a paper presented at the AIDS in the Workplace 
Conference on 27-28 June 1994 at UWC 
9D Budlender 'RURAL WOivlEN: The 'also-rans' in the development stakes' (1992) 12 
Agenda at 27 
10A Strebel 'Women and AIDS: A Study of issues in the Prevention of HIV Infection' 
Dissertation for D.Phil in Psychology at UCT September 1993 at 27-29 (unpublished) 
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the state and society; and implementing the RDP. All these programmes will inherently 
contribute to the upliftment of those previously discriminated against. 
The above detour was necessary in order to illustrate that if the insurance industry 
introduces discriminatory practices in respect of AIDS, they would be discriminating 
against those who have suffered the brunt of apartheid, but more importantly, they would 
be excluding potentially their most important and largest client base. 
This overview of the AIDS crisis paints a bleak picture of the South Afiican situation, a 
view which is further re-inforced by the doomsday predictions of the insurance industry. 
These predictions appear to be predicated on the assumption that AIDS is a unique 
medical problem, and that established insurance practices should not be applied. But is 




AIDS - ITS EPIDEMIOLOGY 
The Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, or AIDS as it is more commonly known, is 
a syndrome (i.e. a set of symptoms which occur together), though most laypersons refer to 
it as a disease. The terms Gay Related Immune Deficiency (GRID) and even Gay cancer 
were initially used to characterise a syndrome that was first reported among young gay 
men in the United States of America. However, once the syndrome's epidemiological 
pattern emerged and cases of the same syndrome were reported among blood transfusion 
recipients, intravenous drug users and heterosexuals in different continents, the term 
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) was introduced and accepted, since it was 
clear that no one group of people was exclusively affected by this new disease. 11 
In South Africa, the first case of AIDS was identified in 1982. Initially the virus spread 
among white male homosexuals. However, this rate of infection has now begun to level 
off. In 1987 AIDS was first diagnosed in the black population, and since then a major 
expansion amongst black heterosexuals has taken place. 12 
2.2 ETIOLOGY 
AIDS is a communicable disease caused by a "Viral organism that is usually referred to as 
the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV). The virus, which resides in many types of 
cells, can be transmitted to an individual in several ways, including by various types of 
11 R Bor, J Elford, G Hart & L Sher 'AIDS-care - into the 90's' (1990) 2 AIDS care no 1 at 
3 
12cape Times :rviarch 18, 1991 
6 
sexual acts in which the virus in infected blood or semen either enters or is absorbed into 
the bloodstream of another person, through the use of needles or syringes carrying small 
amounts of infected blood, from exposure to or receiving a transfusion of contaminated 
blood or blood products, as a result of being the recipient of a transplanted body organ 
from someone whose infection was not detected, and in some instances from an infected 
mother to a fetus during pregnancy. 13 Wltilst no other disease is transmitted in all these 
ways, for example, acute viral hepatitis is transmitted by human blood and urine, the 
wuses that cause gonorrhoea and syphilis are transmitted via the delicate membranes of 
the genital tract and the virus which causes German measles can be transmitted through the 
mother's placenta to the fetus, the methods of transmission of AIDS are not particularly 
distinctive. 14 Thus, in respect of its etiology, AIDS is no different from a number of other 
diseases and is not unique. 
2.3 DIAGNOSIS 
When first confronted with the disease the medical profession had difficulty in diagnosing 
AIDS and the virus that caused it. However, this difficulty was soon overcome, and 
reliable test protocols were established and approved. 15 The test protocols used by the 
South African insurance industry, which closely follows those set up by American insurers, 
is a set of three tests. Firstly, a blood sample is taken from the applicant and subjected to 
an enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) test. If this test returns a positive result, 
a second ELISA test is done. If this second test also returns a positive result, the applicant 
is called in for a fresh blood sample, and this sample is then subjected to another test, this 
13 A Widiss 'To Insure or Not to Insure Persons infected with the Virus that Causes AIDS' 
(1992) 77 Iowa Law Review 1617 at 1628-1630 
14Ibid at 1630 
15Ibid at 1633 
7 
time the WESTERN BLOT test, which is a confirmatory test. If the latter test also returns 
a positive result, the applicant is classified HIV positive. In this event the laboratory which 
performed the confirmatory test informs the insurer's chief medical officer. The latter 
thereafter informs the applicant's designated medical practitioner, who then informs the 
applicant of the outcome of the test. 16 The method of communicating a positive result to 
an applicant is, according to the industry, done in this manner to ensure the confidentiality 
of the test. It, however, leads to "buck-passing" by the industry, as the applicant is saddled 
with knowledge that he or she did not want in the first place, and on top of this the 
applicant has now to arrange his or her own post-test counselling. Whilst the industry does 
arrange pre-test counselling, it does no post-test counselling. 
When the above test protocols are followed, the number of instances in which there is an 
incorrect diagnosis of an infection is less than one half of one percent (0.5%). 17 There are 
various other diseases for which blood tests are used to test for the presence of disease. 
Therefore, in respect of the diagnosis of AIDS, there is nothing unique. 
2.4 TREATMENT AND PROGNOSIS 
With the many advancements in the medical field, there exists effective therapy for the 
treatment of bacterial infections. The same, however, cannot be said for viral infections, 
including HIV infections. Statistical analysis of the population infected with the AIDS 
virus indicates that at least fifty percent (50%) - and maybe as many as eighty-five percent 
(85%) - will develop full-blown AIDS within ten years of contracting the virus. 18 In a 
16Life Offices Associatio of South Africa (LOA) Draft HIV Testing Protocol dated 30 
July 1993 at 3-5 (adopted on 4 November 1993) 
17Widiss (n 13 at 1638) 
18Ibid at 1635 
8 
developing country such as South Africa, the period from contracting the virus to death 
due to AIDS is estimated at five years. 19 Whilst progress has been made with antiretroviral 
drugs such as dideoxyinosine (DDI) and zidowdine ( AZT), these have only managed to 
impede the progression of the disease, not to cure it. 20 In fact, two medical researchers 
have indicated that a powerful vaccine alone will not cure AIDS, and may even make the 
epidemic worse. 21 
Originally the disease was divided into three distinct phases. As more information about 
the disease became available, this was revised and the disease is now seen as falling into 
four distinct phases. These are: 
(l)Acute initial HIV infection: Up to three weeks after first 
infection about seventy percent (70%) of people experience an 
acute viral illness with fever. During this 'window' period, 
antibody tests will usually be negative. The subject will appear to 
recover. 
(2)Asymptornatic infection: Most people then follow a number of 
years when they are infected and antibody positive ( seropositive) 
but have no apparent illness. This interval usually lasts from eight 
to 11 years but in some cases it may last indefinitely. 
(3)Persistent Generalised Lyrnphadenopathy: Then, following a 
trigger, the cause of which is not fully understood, a number of 
19Toms (n 8 at 4) 
20widiss (n 13 at 1635, notes 64 & 66) 
21 Argus September 2, 1994 at 6 
9 
patients will begin suffering from enlarged lymph nodes. Illness, 
night sweats and weight loss will typically follow. 
( 4 )AIDS and Related Conditions: The final stage on this journey is 
AIDS. The immune system has so deteriorated that serious 
illnesses occur with increasing frequency. Most typical of these 
are the constitutional disease of weight loss, diarrhoea and 
persistent cough known as AIDS Related Complex (ARC). But 
there are also neurological diseases including dementia, 
opportunistic infections such as pneumonia and the appearance of 
strange and previously rare cancers such as Kaposi's Sarcoma. 22 
The fact that an lilV infection is frequently a fatal disease does not make the virus unique 
in any way, as viral infections such as yellow fever, smallpox and influenza have killed 
millions of people. Further, illnesses such as lung cancer, pancreatic' cancer and 
cerebrovascular accidents (strokes) are incurable conditions that almost always result in 
death.23 
0 (i} CONCLUSION 
i 
\Vhen AIDS is analysed as a disease in terms of its etiology, diagnosis, treatment and 
prognosis, there is virtually no reason to view it as a medical problem whose uniqueness 
means that it should be treated differently when the insurability of a person who may be 
infected is at issue. After the condition has been diagno~ed, there is no greater justification 
for categorising AIDS as a unique disease than there is for so classifying illnesses such as 
22M Kirby :'AIDS and the LAW (1993) 9 South African Journal of Human Rights 1 at 9 
23Widiss (n 13 at 1637) 
cancer or heart disease. 24 If AIDS is not a unique disease, why is it that the insurance 
industry is so featful of it? What is insurance all about, and why do we need it? 





Life insurance is about peace of mind. 25 It provides financial security to the dependants of 
policyholders or may protect the business assets of partners when one partner dies. By 
investing in life insurance we are also investing in psychological well-being, as well as 
investing in economic well-being, as we are protecting ourselves from the negative 
financial consequences that may result from an uncertain future event, such as death or 
disease. 
3.2 HOW DOES LIFE INSURANCE WORK? 
Life insurance companies 'share' losses by redistributing the cost of these losses among all 
its policyholders. Those fortunate enough to survive for a long time are willing to pay for 
those who suffer ill-health or an early death. The fortunate thus subsidise the 
unfortunate. 26 This takes the form of a regular premium payment by the individual 
(insured) to the company. Payment of the premium usually guarantees that the insured's 
claim will be paid out on the happening of the event insured against. 
Thus, insurance is about the transfer and distribution of risk from the insured to the 
company. For this reason, it has been correctly defined as 'an arrangement under which 
25c Visser 'AIDS and Insurance Law: A preliminary laundry list of issues' (1993) 9 South 
African Journal of Human Rights 130 at 131 
26T Hartwig 'Update on current trends regarding AIDS and the Insurance Industry' a paper 
presented at the AIDS in the Workplace Conference on 27-28 June 1994 at UWC at 1 
12 
an insurer contracts to do something that is of value to an insured upon the occurrence 
of a specified harmful contingent'. 27 This definition clearly indicates that the transfer and 
distribution takes place by means of a contract. Insurance law is mainly concerned with 
the principles of contract. 28 
Fundamental to the business of insurance is the process of underwriting. This is the 
process by which 'an insurer determines whether or not and on what basis it will accept 
an application for insurance. The primary goal of underwriting is the accurate 
prediction of fature mortality and morbidity costs. '29 Insurers use the process of 
underwriting to determine the kind of risk an applicant for insurance will bring to the 
insurance pool. Characteristics which are taken into account and which will affect the risk 
are the age of the applicant, health status, gender, occupation and whether the applicant 
uses alcohol or tobacco. These characteristics will be analysed by the company to enable it 
to understand how these will influence mortality, and to further enable the company to 
classify the risk into classes or categories to charge the appropriate premium. 30 
futegrally linked to the process of underwriting is the concept of risk classification. fu 
essence risk classification involves the development of a number of different categories, 
called II classes 11, to accommodate the varying degrees of risk of loss which individual 
applicants represent to the insurer. 31 Risk classification recognises that, for example, a 70 
year old has a much higher chance of claiming under a life insurance policy than a 30 year 
27M Scherzer 'Insurance' in H L Dalton, S Burris & the Yale AIDS Law Project (Eds) 
AIDS and the Law: A Guide for the Public (1987) Yale University Press at p 187 
281bid at 187 . 
29K A Clifford & RP Iuculano 'Aids and Insurance: The Rationale for AIDS-Related 
Testing' ( 1987) 100 Harvard Law Review 1806 at 1807-1808 
30lbid at 1808 
31J N Hoffman & E Z Kincaid 'AIDS: The Challenge to Life and Health Insurers' 
Freedom of Contract' (1986-87) 35 Drake Law Review 709 at 715-716 
13 
old, that women have greater longevity than men, that someone with heart disease is likely 
to die before someone with a healthy cardiovascular system. 32 By assigning applicants to 
an appropriate class, the insurer can make a reasonable estimate of the risk of loss 
presented in a given case. 33 
Coupled with risk classification is the concept ot:._~_k poolin&_ By pooling risks the insurer r--- --------- ,--
reduces risk variance in order to offer more attractive policies to potential insureds and 
thereby increase the availability of insurance. The insurer, therefore, needs certain 
information from the applicant to effectively classify the applicant according to the risk 
such an applicant brings to the pool. 34 
As stated earlier, insurance falls within the principles of the law of contract. South African 
law of contract recognises freedom of contract, i.e. the right of the parties to the contract 
to agree to anything provided this agreement does not contain any illegal clauses or clauses 
contrary to public policy. Individual life insurance, therefore, is voluntary, i.e. each person 
decides when, whether and for how much he or she will insure or contract for. Given the 
power relationship between the parties and the position from which each party is 
negotiating from, it is usually the insurer who can dictate the terms upon which it will 
accept the risk. The question which now arises is if the applicant is negotiating from a 
position of weakness, why is insurance so necessary? 
3.3 WHY IS INSURANCE NECESSARY? 
32D Keir 'Submission by the Life Offices Association of South Africa to the 
South African Law Commission on matters regarding AIDS and Insurance Law' dated 
February 11, 1993 at 3 
33Ho:ffinan & Kincaid (n 31 at 716) 
34L Bergkamp 'Life Insurance and IIlV Testing: Insurance Theory, Discrimination and 
Solutions' (1989) 8 Medicine and Law 567 at 568 
\ 
14 
Life insurance seives a useful public function in maintaining the :financial security of 
people who depend upon the applicant/insured for support or fulfilment of mutual :financial 
or business obligations. Those whose assets are severely depleted by caring for a 
terminally ill person may be made whole to a degree through the proceeds of such 
insurance. 35 Also, :financial institutions often require the cession of a life insurance policy 
in their favour as collateral security to cover a mortgage bond, short-term loan or overdraft 
facility. Life insurance is more than about peace of mind - 'it is an indispensable 
instrument of finance'. 36 
3.4 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF AIDS TO THE INSURANCE INDUS1RY 
The previous overview of concepts central to insurance enables me to address the pertinent 
question "Why is AIDS so important to the life insurance industry?" This question is 
especially pertinent if one considers that more persons are killed in road traffic accidents 
over a single Easter weekend than the total number of persons to have died from AIDS in 
this country to date. 
The life insurance industry bases the premiums it charges on mortality statistics. Due to 
advances in the medical field, as well as improvements in living conditions, mortality 
,, statistics have steadily improved over the years, and purchasers of insurance have reaped 
the benefit of this improvement in the form of reduced premiums for given amounts of life 
cover. 37 As a result of the AIDS pandemic, the industry expects these mortality statistics 
to decline. 
35Scherzer (n 27 at 187) 
36Visser (n 25 at 131) 
37c Booth 'The Insurance Industry and AIDS - An insider's perspective' (1993) 9 South 
15 
The industry has advanced four reasons as to why it regards AIDS as being significant. 
These are ( 1) that unlike other fatal diseases, the future progression of the disease is still 
unknown, and consequently the industry is having difficulty in predicting its long-term 
effect on mortality rates; (2) that the expected mortality rate of an HIV-infected person is 
up to 50 times greater than that of a non-infected persons of the same age; (3) that due to 
the relatively long period of time during which an HIV-infected person is asymptomatic, 
there is a strong possibility that the person may be aware of his or her condition without 
the insurer knowing about this condition; and ( 4) social problems come to the fore when 
an attempt is made to deal with AIDS, mainly because of the method by which most 
~ 
people become infected.ev 
In the final analysis, however, life insurance companies are 'creations of capita[ism 139, and 
are driven, like most businesses, by a profit motive. AIDS is perceived as a threat to their 
profitability, and remedial steps must therefore be taken to counter this threat. How do 
insurers respond to this threat? 
African Journal of Human Rights 151 at 151 
~Visser (n 25 at 132) 
\:3-9c Visser 'Foundering in the Seas of Human Unconcern: AIDS its metaphors and Legal 
Axiology' (1991) 108 South African Law Journal 619 at 636 
16 
CHAPTER FOUR 
STRATEGIES DESIGNED TO PROTECT THE INDUSTRY 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In an effort to protect itself against the perceived threat posed by HIV -infected persons, 
and to keep, as far as possible, its insurance pools free of AIDS, the industry has adopted 
four strategies. These are: 
(1) the exclusion of AIDS as a covered condition; 
(2) the refusal to insure persons with AIDS; 
(3) the refusal to insure high-risk groups without regard to their 
health status; and 
( 4) requiring the applicant to undergo an HIV antibody test as a 
condition of coverage. 40 
With regard to the above strategies, the first and fourth strategies appear to be the most 
popular with South African insurers. Stone says the following of HIV testing: 
'HIV testing, after all, is orily a very small part of underwriting in 
health and life insurance. ,41 
40J3ergkamp (n 34 at 569) 
41 D A Stone 'The Rhetoric of Insurance Law: The Debate over AIDS Testing' (1990) 15 
17 
Though HIV testing may only be a small part of undetwriting, the issue of testing is one of 
the most debated issues within the industry. 
4.2 1HE ARGUI\11ENTS INF AVOUR OF TESTING 
The proponents of mandatory HIV antibody testing advance the following arguments 
(these contain a strong :financial appeal) for the continued use of the test to determine 
insurability. 
1. The insurance industry will not be able to function adequately ( on a :financially sound 
basis) without HIV testing because of the spiral of adverse selection. 42 Adverse selection 
affects life insurance in one of three ways, namely: (a) individuals who know they are at 
risk buy abnormally large amounts of life insurance; (b) HIV positive individuals buy 
normal amounts of insurance they would not otherwise have bought;_and (c) HIV negative 
individuals switch to self-insurance. 43 Each of these three mechanisms will inevitably lead 
to an increase in premium rates. This in turn will lead to low risk members withdrawing 
from the pooi further increasing premium rates which will in its tum lead to more low risk 
members leaving the pool and this cycle will continue until the pool finally collapses. 
2. HIV testing is in line with underwriting practices, and HIV positive people have to be 
singled out in order to protect (not to discriminate against) other policyholders who are not 
as high a risk as an HIV positive person. 44 It has been suggested that the true motivation 
for the industry's 'no special treatment' argument is not a desire to avoid unfair 
Law and Social Inquiry 385 at 388 
42Visser (n 39 at 635) 
43Bergkamp (n 34 at 574) 
44Visser (n 39 at 635) 
18 
discrimination against people who are rejected because of other health risks, but rather a 
desire to test without regard to social costs. 45 Also, if AIDS is not excluded, applicants 
who have other uninsurable illnesses will lobby to have their illnesses covered. 
3. The prospect oflilV testing will encourage persons not to engage in behaviour which 
increases the risk of infection. 46 This 'incentive' to minimise the risk to oneself by altering 
high risk behaviour has not been successful. Motor vehicle drivers are constantly warned 
of the dangers of reckless or negligent driving, but still persist with such behaviour, and the 
proof of this failure can be found in road accidents statistics. Bergkamp is also of the 
opinion that the scope of this argument (risk minimisation) is limited as it does not apply to 
those who are already lilV positive and can do nothing to change that fact. 47 
4.3 THE ARGUivIENTS AGAINST TESTING 
The proponents of a ban on lilV testing draw on social and humanitarian concerns when 
advancing their arguments. They counter the arguments for testing as follows: 
1
1. The test may have actuarial significance but it cannot predict who will definitely 
J develop 'full-blown' AIDS, it merely indicates a higher probability of contracting it. 48 
Whilst this point is true, it misses the point in that only 100 percent specific and sensitive 
tests should be allowed in underwriting. 49 The current tests, while highly specific, still 
45B Schatz 'The AIDS insurance crisis: underwriting or ~verreaching?' (1987) 100 
Harvard Law Review 1782 at 1798 
46Visser (n 39 at 635) 
47Bergkamp (n 34 at 576) 
48visser (n 39 at 635-636) 
49Bergkamp (n 34 at 572) 
19 
have a 0.05% margin of error. These tests are still fallible during the window period, i.e. 
the period between initial infection and the first signs of viral fever. 
2. HIV testing should be one of the well recognised exceptions to the general rule of rate 
setting on an actuarial basis. so However, exceptions have also beeri made on the basis of 
race and national origin, as well as other diseases. Why should AIDS, and not lung cancer 
or pancreatic cancer, enjoy the same exception? Insurers have pointed out that those 
exceptions that have been allowed have not posed the same threat to them as the threat 
posed by AIDS. 
3. HIV positive test results will burden applicants with information they have not 
requested or desired.51 This argument presupposes that insurers will not be able to provide 
adequate counselling services or arrange for adequate referrals. As pointed out earlier, 
insurers do arrange for pre-test counselling, and the applicant is referred to his or her 
medical practitioner to facilitate post-test counselling. It would probably advisable for an 
applicant to be made aware of his or her infection at the earliest stage possible so as to 
prevent the infection of such applicant's partner(s). 
4. HIV testing may raise ethical issues around confidentiality and privacy.52 Insurers have 
ensured that test protocols are firmly adhered to, and have been dealing with confidential 
information without any problems. However, this has not prevented confidential 
information in respect of HIV positive applicants from leaking out, but fortunately for the 
industry no litigation has arisen from these leaks to date. If testing were prohibited, an 
applicant will not be exposed to the risk of a possible leak of confidential information. 
5oVisser (n 39 at 636) 
51lbid at 636 
52lbid at 636 
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The above are but a few of the many arguments for and against HIV testing. The 
arguments in favour of testing have been advanced by the industry. The main thrust of 
these arguments seems to be that it cannot operate efficiently, i.e. on the basis of actuarial 
~-
soundness, and perhaps at all, if it is burdened will all kinds of social objectives. However, 
actuarial soundness means nothing more than business soundness, which translates into the 
basic fact that an insurer should take in at least as much money in premiums and 
investment income as it expects to spend in claim payments, operating expenses and 
income tax. Stone suggests that there are many ways to manipulate this formula, including 
the changing of premium rates, operating expenses and investment strategies. 53 
The arguments in favour of a ban on HIV testing have been advanced mainly by AIDS 
activists. They argue that HIV testing discriminates against an already overly discriminated 
minority, namely homosexual men. Initially this may have been correct when the first 
AIDS cases were diagnosed in South Africa, but the incidence of A.JPS in the gay 
communities has tapered off, and instead the disease has now become a major threat to the 
black heterosexual population. 54 AIDS activists have also called for insurers to take a 
more distributive role, but have made discrimination, not need, the basis for this 
distribution. They want the State to intervene to prevent insurers from excluding groups 
who have historically been the victims of discrimination, but this line of argument ignores 
those people who are needy but who do not fit into one of the social groups recognised as 
victims of discrimination. 55 
4.4 CONCLUSION 
~one (n 41-aL4D6) 
54see note 12 supra 
55stone (n 41 at 407) 
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I am in agreement with Stone when she points out that ' in their struggle to control the 
representation of the issue, the two sides are so concerned with making their preferred 
policy seem necessary and obvious that they ignore broader societal issues. 156 The 
debates/discourses arowid the issue of HIV testing seem to be more in the line of a crisis 
response to the problem than an e:ff ort to find a long-term solution to the problem 
presented by AIDS. However, testing is not the only popular response by the industry. 
@'})THE VEXED EXCLUSION CLAUSE 
In October 1988 the Life Offices Association of South Africa (LOA), a body representing 
the majority of life insurers, adopted an entrenched agreement relating to the imposition of 
an AIDS exclusion clause. In terms of this agreement members of the LOA may not issue 
a life policy of R200 000 or more, a disability policy of R2 000 per month or more, or a 
business overhead/expense disability income policy ofR8 000 per m?nth or more without 
the applicant supplying a negative HIV antibody test result. Where an applicant declines to 
undergo an HIV test, the member office may, at the request of the applicarit, issue a policy 
with an AIDS exclusion clause.57 The clause reads as follows: 
'In the event of there being a claim under this policy following the 
life assured's death, illness, disorder, disability or inability to 
carry out a remunerative occupation which is due to or arising 
directly or indirectly, entf rely or partially from the Acquired 
Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) or. infection from any 
Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HTV), this policy shall 
5ilbid at 404 
,e;tuDs: The LOA Acts' (1988) 1 Cover 29-31 
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immediately terminate and the proceeds thereof be restricted to 
the surrender value or refund of premiums, whichever is the 
greater. 158 
1 
,li Individuals who become infected through blood transfusions or in the execution of their 
, f duties in the medical or emergency services are exempted from this exclusion. These 
exemptions are clearly discriminatory, as they intend to separate the "innocent" victims of 
AIDS from the ones who are "guilty" (and who should be punished for their guilt). 
Professor Coenraad Visser correctly analyses these exemptions as reiterating 'corporate 
homophobia and racism. ,59 
Another problem with the AIDS exclusion clause, and one that is particularly offensive, is 
the wide discretion accorded to the person or persons who have to exercise the discretion 
(usually the claims manager of the insurer), resulting in most cases in the insurer escaping 
liability. Death need not be the direct result of AIDS or HIV - it is sufficient if it arose 
directly or indirectly, entirely or partially from AIDS or HIV. The causal link does not 
require any objective, logical or rational criteria - all that is required for the coming into 
effect of the clause is the subjective opinion of the authorised representative of the insurer. 
In practice, the company can deny liability if in its opinion, however unreasonable and 
unsubstantiated by medical facts, death can be attributed indirectly and partly to AIDS or 
HIV.60 
1 
~S Agreement dated 1 November 1988, updated 19 February 1993 
• ~is~ (n 25 at 139) 




It is probably for the above reasons that certain insurance companies are not totally 
comfortable with exclusion clauses. If called upon the company will have to prove that the 
policyholder died of AIDS related causes, and it may not be able to do so, especially in the 
case where the body has been cremated. Clem Booth, the chief executive of Munich 
Reinsurance Company of South Afii.ca, finds the exclusion of AIDS as a covered 
condition 'most controversial', as the selection of AIDS as an exception will be seen as 
inappropriate by the public, who do not have much faith in the industry. He further states 
that in his opinion, and that of his group, AIDS exclusions are not the way to go, as this 
merely postpones the problem and does not assist the industry in finding a solution. 61 
4. 7 EXCLUSIVE LIFE 
During April 1993 a member office of the LOA introduced a new life product called 
'Exclusive Life', which the company claimed to be a world first. The conditions attached 
to the product are that the potential applicant would have to undergo an HIV test prior to 
the policy being issued, and repeat HIV testing at five yearly intervals until the applicant 
reaches the age of forty-five years, whereupon the life cover vests. If the applicant fails or 
neglects to undergo the repeat HIV testing, his or her life cover will be reduced to ten 
percent ( 10%) of the original life cover. 62 The company's motivation and justification for 
this new product and its related conditions was that it sought to introduce an AIDS-free 
pool of policyholders to prevent healthy'policyholders in the pool from subsidising HIV -
infected policyholders. This justification seems to be contrary to its primary business, as 
61c Booth (n 37 at 154-155) 
62cape Times April 30, 1993; Daily News April 30, 1993 
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all life insurance contains elements of cross-subsidisation. 63 The introduction of the 
Exclusive Life product initially created a furore (both the concept and its advertising 
campaign64), but this soon died down. In and during June 1994, the chief actuary of 
another life office commented on the fact that in the face of the AIDS pandemic, repeat 
testing of applicants may be the way to go, and that this type of product was becoming 
more popular among applicants for insurance. 65 Three months later this life office 
launched a product similar to the Exclusive Life product, save that with the new product if 
the applicant fails or neglects to undergo the repeat HIV test, the life cover reduces to 
thirty percent (30%) of the original life cover. 
4.8 CONCLUSION 
Professor Edwin Cameron has the following to say about the insurance industry's response 
to the AIDS crisis: 
'Insurance companies, who control a substantial portion of our 
national wealth, have chosen to try and opt out of the crisis 
facing our country. They ask intrusive questions about HIV of all 
insurance applicants, insist on pre-insurance HIV testing in many 
cases and waive coverage for HIV-related eventualities. They use 
the common law rules of contract to exempt themselves from any 
burden in dealing with AIDS and to repudiate liability in the case 
of non-disclosure even where the insured's. death is unrelated to 
63See note 26 
64see 83 South African Medical Journal September 1993 at 690 
65Hartwig ( n 26 at 4) 
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HIV. They, alone, it seems, propose to survive South Africa's 
AIDS epidemic unscathed. i66 
How have international insurers responded to the perceived AIDS threat facing them? 
66E Cameron 'Human Rights, Racism and AIDS: The New Discrimination' (1993) 9 South 
African Journal of Human Rights 22 at 25 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
It is generally accepted that American and European insurers are more experienced than 
their South African counterparts in that they were confronted by the AIDS crisis before the 
South African insurers. This is especially true in the case of American insurers, as they 
also sell health insurance (medical aids), and whilst Americans do not have a right to life 
insurance, the right to health is regarded as a fundamental right. Allied to this right is the 
fact that health care should be a:ff ordable, so the AIDS threat directly affects insurers. 
How have American insurers responded? 
5.2 THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 
At the outset of the AIDS crisis, testing for medical conditions including blood tests were 
generally accepted. 67 However, with the spread of AIDS this general acceptance was 
challenged. Several states in America then proposed legislation to prevent insurers from 
using HIV tests and the results of those tests for insurability purposes. Clifford and 
Iuculano argue that this move was based on a misunderstanding of insurance principles and 
a desire to prevent discrimination against homosexuals. 68 Schatz, however, argues that the 
reason for this move was to prevent insurers from discriminating against gay and bisexual 
men, as an August 1985 report of the chair of the American Council of Life Insurers 
(ACLI) and the Health Insurance Association of America (HIAA) states that the major 
67R P Iuculano 'Life Insurance: Legislative and Regulatory Restrictions on AIDS-Related 
Testing' in W H L Domette (Ed)AJDS and the Law (1992) Wiley Law Publications at 214 
68Cli:fford & Iuculano (n 29 at 1814-1815) 
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threat to insurers is posed by the homosexual population, and that antibody testing should 
be aimed at this population. 69 
In April 1985, the Californian legislature introduced a law prohibiting, for insurability 
purposes, the use of blood tests to detect antibodies in respect of AIDS, as the use of these 
tests was seen as discriminating against a particular minority, namely homosexual men. 70 
The next state to follow California was Wisconsin, which in July 1985 introduced a law 
similar to that of California, but more restrictive in that insurers were also prohibited from 
' 
enquiring whether an applicant had previously taken an HIV antibody test.71 The third 
state to follow suit was Florida, which enacted a law prohibiting the use of serological tests 
to determine insurability once the Secretary of the Department of Health declares a threat 
to public health because of the existence of an infectious disease. However, this law only 
related to the tests conducted under the Secretary's declaration, and did not expressly 
prohibit an insurer from ordering its own HIV antibody tests. 72 Meanwhile, in Wisconsin 
in November 198 5 remedial law was introduced which allowed insurers to test for HIV 
antibodies in respect of individual life and health insurance, but only once the state 
epidemiologist and the insurance commissioner had made a finding in respect of the 
reliability of the tests. This finding was finally made on 29 August 1986. 73 Fallowing 
closely on the above the state of Maine initially introduced legislation prohibiting the use, 
not only of HIV antibody testing, but also tests to measure the virus as well as a test to 
69schatz (n 45 at 1799) 
70califomia Health and Safety Code quoted in Clifford & Iuculano (n 29 at p 1815 note 
48) 
7llbid at 1815 note 49 
72ruculano (n 67 at 214) 
731bid at 215 
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measure the immune system. However, this was not enacted and instead a law baning 
insurers from enquiring about the results of a previous test was passed. 7 4 
The most serious "threat" to insurers came from legislation enacted in the District of 
Columbia by that district's City Council. This legislation prohibited the use of all AIDS-
related tests for a period of five years, including tests for IIlV antibodies, tests for the 
condition of the immune system and tests to identify the AIDS virus itself. It also 
prohibited insurers from using factors such as age, marital status, geographic area of 
residence, occupation, sex or sexual orientation for the purpose of seeking to predict which 
individual would in future develop AIDS or AIDS Related Complex. 75 
( On~5 August 1986 the ACLI and HIAA filed a suit against the District of Columbia, on the 
grounds that the statute enacted violated both the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution and 
the extra-territoriality prohibition of the District of Columbia Self-Government and 
Government Reorganization Act. 76 The court held in favour of the District, claiming that 
whilst the District may have acted too hastily in imposing the five year moratorium, it had 
not acted arbitrarily or irrationally. The District had also acted constitutionally in that it 
had attempted to regulate, by statute, companies within the district only and not those 
outside the district. (the result of this decision was that most commercial insurers ceased 
selling individual health and life insurance in the District of Columbia whilst the ban was in 
place.77 
74Ibid at 215 
75Ibid at 215 
76ACLivDistrict of Columbia 645 F Supp 84 (DDC 1986) (Civil Action No 86-2131) 
quoted Ibid at 328-333 
77R R Bovbjerg 'AIDS and Insurance: How Private Health Coverage Relates to 1-IlV / AIDS 
Infection and to Public Programs' (1992) 77 Iowa Law Review 1561 at 1591 -------
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By 1988, however, almost all the states in the USA had removed any prohibition on the 
use of HIV antibody testing for insurability purposes, and instead substituted a requirement 
that there should be l)re:-aJ!d ~os!:_!~st _counseJ!ing:,_78 
5.3 TIIE AMERICAN SOLUTIONS 
As a result of being con.fronted with the problem at an earlier stage, and also because 
American insurers are involved in the provision of health insurance, they and their state 
insurance regulators have attempted to find a solution to the problems of applicants 
excluded from insurance due to HIV seropositivity. These solutions are mainly in the area 
of health insurance, but would have application to the South African life insurance context. 
5.3.1 IDGH RISK POOLS 
The first of these solutions, what Stone calls 'the industry's preferred solution 1, 79 works 
on the basis of spreading the costs of insuring high risk applicants among all the insurers. 
This calls for mandatory high risk pools, where each health insurer in a given state is 
compelled to accept a share of previously rejected applicants. Its share is calculated in 
relation to its market share in that particular state. 80 The pool is usually administered by 
one insurer, who has been appointed by the others operating in the state. Eligibility for 
these high risk pools is limited to residence in the state for a minimum period, usually 
twelve months. Cover is limited to those of major medical policies (the policy only covers 
major expenses), and is often subject to limitations for certain treatments. Pre-existing 
conditions, i.e. a condition which existed prior to the entry into the pooi or a sickness 
78Iuculano (n 67 - 1992 update at 91-96) 
~o~ (n 41 at 407) 
80scnatz (n 45 at 1796) 
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which manifests itself within six months of entry, are not covered until twelve months from 
entry into the pool has elapsed. The policy may be renewed, unless the maximum lifetime 
benefits have been reached. 81 
Ai Premiums for these policies are usually higher than for healthy insureds, and benefits are 
generally less comprehensive. Schatz gives the figure for premiums as statutorily limited.to 
150% to 200% higher than that of the average premium for healthy insureds. 82 Though 
the premiums are higher and the benefits are less, the cost of these pools usually exceeds 
the income generated from premiums and investment income. Subsidisation is therefore 
necessary, and these deficits are covered by imposing assessments on the insurers operating 
in that state. 83 These assessments are eventually passed onto other policyholders. 84 
rerefore, if more applicants join these pools, the assessments on insurers would be 
higher, which in tum would mean that either the premiums for healthy insureds are 
~creased or a state subsidy would be necessary. Schatz views these _high risk pools as 
vitally important, as it makes health insurance available to those who otherwise would not 
be covered. 85 
5.3.2 OPEN ENROLMENT PERIODS 
The second solution to the problem of insurability is that of open enrolment in the state-
controlled Blue Shield and Blue Cross Plans. These plans would declare open enrolment 
periods when all applicants who have been rejected by private insurers could become 
members. As with the mandatory high risk pools, this type of coverage usually offers 
81Widiss (n 13 at 1723-1728) 
82schatz (n 45 at 1796) 
83Widiss (n 13 at 1727) 
84schatz (n 45 at 1796) 
85Ibid at 1797 
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lower benefits, longer waiting periods before benefits become effective, pre-existing 
conditions are excluded for longer periods, and cost more than similar coverage at standard 
\\ rates. 86 Again, as with the mandatory high risk pools, these open enrolment periods allow 
\\ applicants who would not have ~uajifieclto obtain cover, albeit on a limited basis. 
5.3.3 SPECIALISED UNDERWRITING 
The last solution is not really a solution in the true sense of the word, but makes cover 
available in very limited circumstances. Certain companies specialise in underwriting 
persons who suffer from serious medical conditions, and therefore a person suffering 
from, for instance, cancer may still be able to obtain insurance. This is possible when the 
cost of cover is not an object. When it becomes evident, as in certain cases in the USA, 
that HIV positive persons may remain asymptomatic for ten to fifteen years, life insurance 
may become more available to persons who are HIV positive. 87 
5.4 NETIIERLANDS AND TI-IE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE 
The position in the Netherlands is similar to that of South Africa in that should a potential 
applicant for insurance require life cover above a certain amount, he or she has to submit 
to an HIV antibody test. A similar situation also exists in respect of how insurers obtain 
information about prospective applicants, namely requiring applicants to answer questions 
posed in the application form. One question, known as the 'blood question', is posed very 
widely, and reads as follows: 
86Bovbjerg (n 77 at 1594-5 note 177) 
87Widiss (n 13 at 1721-2) 
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'Has your blood ever been examined for blood disease, diabetes, 
kidney disease, amount of fat (for instance cholesterol), hepatitis 
(A or B), sexually transmitted diseases such as syphilis or AIDS? 
If so, why, when, for what reasons and with which result?lis8 
The National Committee on AIDS Control is of the opinion that the above question is too 
wide and invasive, given the individual's right to privacy. It feels that because of this 
question the balance between the contracting parties (i.e. the applicant and the insurer) has 
shifted in favour of the insurer. Accordingly, the Committee has proposed that the use of 
the IIlV antibody test be limited to those special cases where the applicant applies to be 
insured for a sum greater than he or she needs to cover real risks, talcing into account the 
applicant's social position and personal situation. IIlV antibody testing as part of an 
insurance application should also be forbidden, except as set out above. Further, the blood 
question on the application form should be amended to read 'Do you have AIDS?' and 
'Are you HIV-seropositive?'. These recommendations have been accepted by the Dutch 
Health Council and the matter has been forwarded to parliament. 89 
It would appear that other European countries such as the United Kingdom, France, 
Germany and Spain also require an IIlV antibody test when an applicant applies for life 
cover above a certain amount. 90 
5.5 THE AFRICAN EXPERIENCE 
88E TM Olsthoom-Heim 'HIV Testing and Private Insurance' (1993) 12Medicine and 
Law pll at 12 
89Ibid at 13-14 
90Ibid at 11 
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i±_Il ~eny~ many companies had what was called a free cover limit (FCL). This was fixed 
at the equivalent ofR50 000. An applicant could, therefore, apply for life cover and be 
insured for up to this free cover limit without having to submit to an HIV antibody test. 
However, as a result of pressure from overseas reinsurers and the poor views on the AIDS 
projections, this free cover limit has been dropped to R25 000. As these AIDS projections 
become a reality, the free cover limit is being looked at again with the view to reducing the 
amount further. 
In Zimbabwe the government initially opted to ban all HIV antibody testing for insurance 
~
purposes. Insurers and the government then entered into a period of negotiation, 
whereafter a protocol was agreed upon and the ban on HIV antibody testing was lifted, but 
only if the life cover applied for exceeded 2$100 000. Where the life cover required is less 
than this amount, insur_gs_cannotins_ist oI1A_1:est.91 
In Malawi, as a result of the high incidence of AIDS, insurers introduced HIV antibody 
testing. The government responded by withdrawing the insurers' right to insist on a test as 
a condition of coverage. Insurers responded to this ban by raising premium rates, in some 
cases by as much as 500%, and even this was not sufficient to cover the negative claims 
experience of insurers. As in the case of the situation in the District of Columbia, Malawi 
insurers withdrew individual life products from the market. Shortly thereafter the ban on 
HIV antibody testing was lifted. Insurers may now suggest that a prospective applicant 
undergo an HIV antibody test. Failure to take the test results in the applicant being 
declined for life insurance. 92 
r: 
~ooth (n 37 at 153) 
\Vlbid at 153 
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For some African based life insurance companies the potential effect of AIDS is 
catastrophic. At the thirteenth conference of the International Association of Consulting 
Actuaries, M J Bell explored a number of ways in which African life insurers could reduce 
or limit their exposure to AIDS. These include the removal of all mortality options from 
contracts (e.g .. guaranteed renewability without medical evidence); reducing terms to 20 
years; withdrawal of all term assurance; the strengthening of underwriting standards 
including mv antibody tests; increasing premium rates; changing policy design to remove 
the mortality risk taken and the inclusion of a clause empowering the company to vary 
benefits or increase premiums. 93 
5.6 SIMILARTIY IN STRATEGIES - SOU1H AFRICA AND THE USA 
It is interesting to note how closely the South African insurance industry follows in the 
footsteps of the American insurance industry. In an effort to place a cap on its costs, the 
American insurance industry adopted four strategies, and South African insurers have 
adopted these same strategies. American insurers follow a specific HIV test protocoi 
which has also been adopted by South African insurers. In an effort to ease the cares of 
health workers, specifically nurses, an American based insurer has entered into an 
agreement with the Ontario Nurses Association to offer a special policy to their members. 
A member who has purchased this policy will be paid a cash lump sum on contracting the 
HIV infection, with no questions being asked as to how the member contracted the virus. 94 
In September 1994 the South African Nursing Association advised its members of 
,&i J de H Bell 'The impact of AIDS on the actuarial management of an African Life 
Office' at the 13th International Association of Consulting Actuaries Conference May 
1992 
94'As Demand for HIV Insurance grows, Insurers Move to Market New Policies' American 
Journal of Nursing May 1992 at 93&96 
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insurance it had negotiated with a local broker and which is being underwritten by Lloyd's 
of London. Whilst the cover is short-term, it makes provision for a cash payment should 
the member test positive for the AIDS virus, regardless of how the virus was contracted. 95 
Where the South African insurance industry has overtaken its American counterparts is in 
the area of repeat testing. It remains to be seen if South Africa can claim a world first by 
introducing a lasting solution to the problem of life insurance for HIV seropositive persons. 
5. 7 CONCLUSION 
From this short overview of the international experience and response it can be clearly seen 
that insurers are preparing themselves to survive ( and overcome) the AIDS crisis. One 
point which is conspicuous is tha\~~!~~~ become accepted 
. ----.. 
internationally,,. But what happens to persons who are not aware that they are infected, and 
only find out once having undergone an HIV antibody test? Or the individual who tests 
positive after paying for life cover for five years, only to find his or her life cover has been 
reduced to 10% of the original amount? Clearly these people suffer psychological, social 
and :financial disadvantages, and probably discrimination too. For example, you would 
most likely not be granted a mortgage bond, overdraft or other :financial assistance if you 
11 I: are HIV positive, as you will not be able to furnish the necessary collateral security (in the 
~ form of a life insurance policy) required by deposit-taking institutions. 
The above illustrates that the response to the AIDS crisis by insurers has been anything but 
creative. In the scramble to protect their "solvency" and profitability, insurers have lost 
sight of the fact they also fulfil a social function. What insurers, AIDS activists, 
government, employers and the public should focus on is not whether there is a need for 
95Sunday Times September 11, 1994 at 15 
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~HIV antibody testing, but what can be done to assist those persons who are or who will 





The National AIDS Plan for South Africa 1994-1995 under the section dealing with 
Insurance Law, has as its priority the following: 
'To negotiate a basis upon which the life and health insurance 
needs of persons with HIV/AIDS can be fairly accommodated. '96 
South Africa has entered a new era in its history, and its people are attempting to put the 
past behind it and grapple with the issues facing it. One of the most important problems it 
has is to find an equitable solution to is the AIDS crisis, and more specifically the problem 
of its citizens who are HIV seropositive and therefore uninsurable. This sqlution must be 
acceptable to all parties, without favouring one party above another, and must be what 
alternative dispute resolution calls a "win-win" solution. Are there any solutions to this 
problem? 
6.2 THE BROKER SOLUTION 
Insurance brokers, in an attempt to be of assistance to their clients who have serious 
medical conditions, have devised various schemes and products to circumvent their clients' 
®NACOSA :'A National AIDS Plan for South Africa 1994-1995' July 1994 at p 47 
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uninsurability. One such plan, called the Medsave Plan, and negotiated by brokers 
O'Hanrahan and Associates and two leading underwriters merits some attention. 97 
The plan consists of three products, namely, a pure endowment policy, unit trusts and a 
retirement annuity policy (without life cover). The applicant contributes R300 per month 
to the plan, and for the purposes of this example is a male aged 28 years next birthday, 
who will develop full-blown AIDS at 35 years of age. The term for all these contracts will 
therefore be seven years. From the sum ofR300, R75 is paid as a premium to the pure 
endowment, R125 is paid to the unit trusts and the balance ofRlO0, escalating at 15% per 
annum, is contributed toward the retirement annuity. The latter contribution is deductible 
for income tax purposes. 98 
The benefits emerging at age 35 would be R29 000 (assuming a growth rate of 15%) to 
pay for medical expenses, and a monthly annuity ofR250. In terms of the Income Tax 
Act, a member may not access his or her retirement annuity before reaching the age of 5 5 
years, unless the Commissioner is satisfied that the member has become permanently 
incapable of carrying on his or her occupation.99 Full-blown AIDS qualifies as 
permanently incapable in this case. Further , it has been negotiated with the underwriters 
that the person will be treated as if he has reached the age of 65 (because of the reduced 
life expectancy) and the annuity will carry a nil guarantee ( cease on death). As a result of 
these concessions the monthly annuity payment is higher. In addition to this a back-to-
back scheme ( an annuity funding an endowment) has been arranged which will return the 
97 A Duigan 'Uninsurables can provide' Vitae May/June 1993 at 59 
98section ll(n)(aa) Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 
99Definition of 'retirement annuity fund', subsection (v) thereof contained in section 1 of 
the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 
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capital used to purchase the monthly annuity. This ensures that the applicant's dependants 
receive approximately R25 000 on his death. 
This plan is flexible as there is no life cover attached to the products, and therefore the 
applicant's age does not matter. It is innovative in that it utilises existing products, and no 
new products and systems have to be developed. Its major drawback lies in the fact that it 
is expensive and is only affordable at the top end of the market. 
6.3 HIGH RISK POOLS 
Whilst South Africa should develop its own solutions for its problems, it is sometimes 
better not to re-invent the wheeL but to adapt the existing wheel to suit the conditions in 
South Africa. With this in mind, the High Risk Pools preferred by the American Health 
Insurers could be adapted to the South African life insurers' needs. This would entail the 
insurers accepting their "share" of rejected applicants in relation to their share of the 
market. For example, if Old Mutual has 40% of the life insurance market, it would accept 
40% of the rejected applicants. Currently 10% of its applicants in the KwaZulu/Natal area 
are rejected due to HIV seroposivit{@ One life office would have to be appointed to 
administer the pool. There would have to be a lien period of two to three years in favour 
of the insurer who issued the policy (i.e. the claim would not be paid if the applicant died 
within this lien period). Premiums would be high, as at present insurers estimate that an 
HIV positive person represents a risk 50 times higher than that of a standard risk. 
Benefits/coverage would have to be limited in line with the applicant's real risks to be 
covered, income, number of dependants and reasons for insuring. Even then, as more and 
more HIV positive persons join this pooL the income received in premiums and investment 
@9Hartwig (n 26 at 3) 
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would probably not be sufficient to cover claims. The pool can be expected to sustain 
substantial losses. 101 These losses would then have to be made good by the life offices 
participating in the pool. This would, in effect constitute an extra tax on insurers, and 
would be contrary to the four fund approach negotiated between insurers and Inland 
Revenue, as well as the trend of the last four years which has seen company rates drop 
from 50% to 35%. However, I am aware of one life office who is investigating the 
possibility of setting up such a high risk pooL but for group schemes rather than for 
individual life insurance. 
L 
@PEN ENROu..IBNT PERIODS 
Another possible solution that can be borrowed from the Americans and adapted to suit 
South African needs is that of open enrolment periods. This would entail an insurer 
advertising that during a certain period, for example, within 30 days of the advert, it would 
accept all applicants regardless to health or HIV status. 
Once again this would mean that premiums would be higher than those charged for 
standard risks, and the benefits/ coverage would be limited to real risks to be covered, 
income, number of dependants and reasons for insuring. There would also have to be a 
lien period during which the benefits would not be paid. 
A system similar to this has been attempted by certain life offices in South Africa, not as 
an attempt to provide cover for uninsurable applicants but as an attempt to gain market 
share, with not altogether successful results. The life office in question marketed the 
scheme as endowment assurance with minimum life cover, with no medical being 
101Clifford & Iuculano (n 29 at 1822) 
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questions asked. The case eventually came before the Appellate Division as A A 
MUTUAL LIFE ASSOCIATION LTh1ITED v SINGH. 102 The facts of the case are as 
follows: 
On 3 February 1986 Singh's wife completed a proposal form as proposer and life assured 
for a 10 year endowment policy with minimum life cover. Singh was named as 
beneficiary. On 23 March 1986 the proposer died - she was suffering from cervical cancer 
- and the insurer repudiated liability under the policy. Singh approached the Provincial 
Division for relief and his claim was upheld. The insurer elected to take the matter on 
appeal to the Appellate Division. 
The policy was marketed as an investment policy, with minimum life cover included to 
comply with the Sixth Schedule (now repealed) to the Income Tax Act. The marketing 
notes which accompanied the application form and issued by the insurer stated 'Free 
cover ... up to R30 000 sum assured. free of medical evidence. ' In explaining the policy to 
the broker, the agent of the insurer stated that applicants fit to lead normal lives and who 
were employed in their normal occupations would qualify as potential purchasers. 
Whilst neither the proposer, nor the broker who completed the proposal form filled in the 
medical questions, the proposer signed and warranted that all statements and answers given 
in connection with the policy were true and correct. Counsel for the insurer argued that 
the manner in which the warranty question had been drafted required the proposer to 
disclose any facts which were material to the risk the insurer was to undertake. There was, 
therefore, an obligation on the proposer to disclose that she was suffering from cancer. As 
the proposer had failed to do so, the insurer was entitled to repudiate liability. 
1021991 (3) SA 514 AD 
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The court held that the warranty section could not be regarded in isolation, but had to be 
read in the light of the questions that preceded it. As the insurer was not interested in the 
proposer's medical history, she was not required to disclose this. The warranty section 
dealt with whether the proposer was actively employed in her usual occupation, which she 
had answered truthfully. The court further held that as the proposer was not required to 
answer any medical questions, the insurer must be taken to have waived its right to require 
information as to the proposer's state of health. The appeal was dismissed. 
If one accepts that this type of insurance will in all probability be used for mortgage 
protection or to make provision for dependants, having an insurer repudiate liability under 
the policy will cause serious :financial hardship. The initial reason for entering into the 
policy would then have been defeated. 
/ These solutions have one common thread permeating them, namely, the solution is private 
§ and the total cost will be borne by insurers. AIDS is a societal problem, and accordingly 
/ the whole of society must be involved in the solution. Insurers will have to contribute to 
1 
/ the cost of the solution, but they cannot be expected to bear all the costs. For these 
{ reasons the solution should not be private. Should the cost be transferred to the public? 
6.5 THE PUBLIC SOLUTION 
A further solution, and an alternative to the exclusively private solution, is to allow HIV 
antibody testing, and to accommodate all those applicants rejected by the private insurers 
into a public insurance scheme. 103 Setting up such a scheme should not involve too many 
complexities as various public insurance schemes already exist in South Africa ( e.g .. 




Workmen's Compensation, Unemployment Insuranc/ Fund and the Multilateral Motor 
' - ----~ ,:---------· -
Vehicle Fund). This would be a truly public solution. ~-------, .. 
However, this scheme suffers from three major drawbacks. Firstly, adverse selection will 
be at its greatest as only HIV positive persons will join the scheme. These persons may, 
because such a scheme exists, decide to purchase insurance which they would otherwise 
not have purchased, or purchase abnormally large amounts of insurance. Secondly, how 
would the premium be calculated? Should it be a fixed cost, such as a percentage of all 
claim payments, or related to the applicant's circumstances? A policy with a sum assured 
ofRlOO 000 would require a premium ofR4 633 per annum for someone newly mv 
positive, RIO 928 for someone who has been IDV positive for five years and RI 7 97 5 for 
someone who has been HIV positive for ten years. 104 Based on the above, the public 
scheme would have to be heavily subsidised in order to make it accessible to everyone. 
Lastly, the scheme would retain all the negative consequences associated with HIV 
antibody testing by insurers. 105 
~~ COMBINED/MIXED SOLUTION 
The solution that has to be preferred is the one which combines both the private and the 
public. Coenraad Visser states that what is needed is 'to involve both the insurance 
industry and the public sector. '106 This solution would have the private insurers and the 
public insurance scheme operating in tandem, with the public scheme compensating the 
private insurers for the losses occasione~ by the ban on testing. However, only those 
claims that can be ascribed to the ban on testing will be covered by the public scheme. All 
104J Slawski - Actuary- Southern Life Association Limited 6 May 1994 
105Bergkamp (n 34 at 578) 
10~Visser (n 25 at 141) 
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other claims will still have to be met by private insurers. The i~~~ s~~~would thus re-
7 imburse private insurers for their losses arising out of adverse selection.due to the ban on 
~- tes~~i 07 Whilst this solution is not perfect, it is reasonable and should be acceptable to 
1
all parties. 
Various conditions would have to be attached to this solution to make it a workable model. 
Firstly, there must be a limit to the sum assured obtainable from the public scheme. This 
will be determined in accordance with each applicant's income, family structure and 
dependants, reasons for insuring and real risks to be covered ( e.g. mortgage bond 
protection or overdraft facility protection or both). Should the applicant require more 
insurance than he or she qualifies for in terms of the criteria, he or she will have to submit 
to an HIV antibody test. 108 Placing. caps on the limits covered by the public scheme will 
---"-'='=c,_·= 
also counter the effects o~~~-selec~~~j>n the scheme. 
Secondly, as with current life cover in respect of suicide, if the applicant dies within two 
years of the date of issue of the policy, he or she is presumed to have misrepresented his or 
her health status to the insurer. In this case, the life cover will not be paid. However this 
presumption is rebuttable if the family members, dependants or executor can provide 
evidence that the policyholder had not misrepresented information. 109 
Lastly, if the policyholder dies of AIDS or AIDS related causes after ten years of the date 
of issue of the policy, he or she will not be covered by the public scheme, but this will be 
for the private insurer's cost. The reason for this is that the claim could hardly be related to 
107Bergkamp (n 34 at 578-9) 
108lbid at 578 
l09Ibid at 578 
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the prohibition on HIV testing. However, the insurer may present evidence of the bad 
faith of the policyholder. llO 
A further argument favouring this solution, and one which should appeal to the industry, 
is the legitimacy of the LO A Life Register. The LO A keeps a central life register in which 
it records the medical history and general medical condition of the proposed life assured. 
This information is stored and controlled by the LOA, and only made available to 
members of the LOA The ostensible reason for maintaining this register is to combat the 
lack of information on the part of the insurer ( and thereby enforce the duty of disclosure). 
One way of obtaining the information necessary to assess the risk is for the proposed life 
assured to sign aeivaiv~r.:::fJ~_!!_Se~-:-which is contained in all proposal forms. 
Schulze, however, argues that this waiver clause is invalid. Collecting and storjng_.~ 
confidential information about another person's health constitutes a wrongful invasion of --
privacy. Also, the disclosure of this information to other members of the LOA is a further 
wrongful invasion of privacy. 111 He contends that the waiver clause is invalid, firstly, 
because it is framed too wide. To be valid the consent given by an applicant must be given 
with the applicant's full knowledge and appreciation. This is not the case with the waiver 
clause. Secondly, the consent is given to a specific life insurance company and authorises 
the latter to collect information. It does not authorise the insurer to store the said 
information, or to make this information available to other insurers. 112 The industry could 
be exposed to numerous delictual claims for wrongful invasion of privacy. 113 To date no 
1JQ1:bid at 579 
(!yw Schulze 'The LOA Life Register - a snap survey of possible legal pitfalls' (1994) 57 
THRHR 75 at 80-81 
112Ibid at 81 
113Ibid at 82 
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litigation has arisen from this register, but this does not rule out the possibility of such 
litigation. 
However, should the combined solution be agreed upon and implemented by all the 
parties, such a register will be a necessity in order to prevent adverse selection, and more 
specifically to prevent applicants from attempting to obtain more life insurance than they 
would be entitled to without an HIV antibody test. Accepting this solution would give the 
register the legitimacy it now lacks and prevent the industry from being exposed to a rash 
of lawsuits. This solution, therefore, has benefits for all parties to the solution. 
6. 7 CONCLUSION 
As stated earlier, this latter solution is not perfect, but presents a reasonable and workable 
model (the so-called win-win solution). The costs are distributed more evenly across the 
whole of society. The funding for the public insurance scheme could be raised by an 
across the board levy, such as the current transitional levy. This model is also aligned to 
the National AIDS Plan, which proposes the following: 
'.An investigation should be made into whether a central fund can 
be established for reinsuring insurance and other claims paid out 
in respect of HIV~related illness and deaths. Insurance actuaries 
should be approached to devise a reinsurance fand and to 
calculate the appropriate costs and levies.,11 4 
114NACOSA (n 96 at 47) 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE CONSTITUTION AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHfS 
7.1 INlRODUCTION 
On 27 April 1994 the Interim Constitution, Act 200 of 1993, came into operation. In 
terms of s 7(1), the Constitution binds both the legislative and executive organs of the state 
at all levels. This means that parliament, provincial government and local government is 
bound by the Constitution and must abide by it. However, s 33(4) also makes provision 
for persons or bodies other than those mentioned above to be prohibited from practising 
unfair discrimination. To give effect to this the Constitution also introduces so-called 
'class actions' [ s 7( 4 )(b )(iv)], and also recognises the right of a person or persons to act in 
the public interest [s 7(4)(b)(v)]. 
7.2 THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY 
Given South Africa's history and its glaring lack of a human rights culture, it is not 
surprising that the first fundamental right introduced by the Constitution is the right of 
equality. The Constitution contains both a preamble and a so-called after-amble, and calls 
for and makes provision for equality. The preamble calls for a 'democratic constitutional 
state in which there is equality between men and women and people of all races'. 
Schedule 4, which in terms of section 232( 4) is given the same status as the Constitution, 
once again re-iterates the principle of equality between men and women, people of all 
races, and also of racial and gender equality. Chapter 3 of the Constitution deals with 
Fundamental Rights (the so-called Bill of Rights). Section 8(1) once again confirms the 
principle of equality and reads as follows: 
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'Every person shall have the right to equality before the law and 
equal protection of the law. ' 
The principle of equality is enshrined in the Constitution. Section 8(2) further con:fums 
that no person shall be unfairly discriminated against, whether directly or indirectly, and 
then lists fourteen categories or classes which are protected against discrimination. This list 
is by no means exhaustive, but it does seem to imply that only those categories or classes 
that may be added in future will only apply to human traits, as the original fourteen 
categories only deal with human traits. But no rights are absolute, and s 33 limits the rights 
contained in chapter 3. What happens when a fundamental right is infringed? 
7.3 1HE OPERATION OF 1HE CONSTITIJTION 
If an aggrieved person or persons approaches the Constitutional Court for relief, the court 
will institute a two-pronged investigation. The first part of the investigation will be to 
establish if the party against whom the relief is being sought has violated or breached the 
complaining party's rights. If the court answers this in the affirmative, the second part of 
the investigation then begins, namely, to determine if the breach complained of falls within 
the limitations allowed bys 33. To fall within this limitation the breach must be 
reasonable, justifiable, not negate the essential content of the right, and in certain instances 
it must be necessary. If the breach satisfies all these requirements, the party who sought 
relief will not have been successful. However, if the breach fails on any one of the above 
grounds, the complaining party will be entitled to relief. Given the scope of the 
Constitution, does it provide any relief for persons who are HIV positive and therefore 
excluded from obtaining life insurance? 
7.4 1HE CONSTITIJTIONAL SOLUTION? 
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It would be obvious for the lilV positive person or persons excluded from obtaining life 
insurance to approach the court in terms of s 8(2), which deals with the various categories 
of unfair discrimination. The most important category for the purposes of this dissertation 
l( is that of.:.d_isq_&_fttr; Thus, no person may be unfairly discriminated against on the basis 
of such person's disability. A person who has full-blown AIDS can clearly be said to be 
suffering from a disability, and therefore may not be discriminated against. Can a person 
who is lilV positive call on the same protection on the basis that he or she has a disability? 
If one takes into account the fact that lilV positive persons are asymptomatic for long 
periods of time, and are able to function in the same way as healthy persons, a court may 
have difficulty coming to the conclusion that such a person is a person with a disability. 
The disability, however, could be found in the fact that an mv positive person has an 
l immune system which is deficient ( suppressed), · and would be more susceptible to . infections than a healthy person. Thus, to be successful the plaintiff _would have to lead 
the necessary medical evidence, and this could only be done on an individual basis. 
. Professor Edwin Cameron is of the opinion that the Constitution will come to the 
;/ 
~- assistance of the person referred to above. 115 He appears to base his opinion on the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, and more specifically the definition of 'disabled 
person' in this Act. This definition was modelled on s504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973, and this latter Act supports the view that an mv infection will be classified as a 
disability by the American courts. 116 Further, a report prepared for members of the 
American Congress by the House Judiciary Committee on the Americans with Disabilities 
115E Cameron 'AIDS and the South African Legal System: Human Rights and 
Employment Law' a paper presented at the AIDS in the Workplace Conference on 27-28 
June 1994 at UWC and at 3 
116Widiss (n 13 at 1690) 
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Act specifically mentions an HIV infection to be a disability. 117 In interpreting our 
Constitution the Constitutional Court may be guided by the above reasoning as South 
Africa lacks a human rights culture, and our courts will be guided by the decisions of 
countries having similar constitutions. 
Section 28 of the Constitution grants every person the right to acquire and hold rights in 
property. The word 'property' is used in its wider sense, and would include the right to 
acquire immovable property. All financial institutions require the cession of a life policy 
qn the life of the mortgagor in their (the institution's) favour as a requirement for the 
granting of the mortgage bond. An HIV positive applicant will not be able to fulfil this 
condition, and will therefore be deprived of his or her right to acquire property. Such a 
person may approach the court for relief on the basis that the requirement of a life policy 
indirectly discriminates against him or her. 
Whilst the above would appear to offer possible solutions to the problem, these solutions 
would have to clear two further hurdles. Firstly, in terms of s33(l)(a)(i) and (ii), these 
Fundamental Rights may be limited 'to the extent that such limitation is reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality.' A 
convincing argument by the insurance industry that a prohibition on the testing and 
exclusion of HIV positive applicants is in breach of their right to freely engage in economic 
activity (business/financial necessity), could find favour with a court. Secondly, Act 200 
of 1993 is an interim Act, designed to cover the period until the Constitutional Assembly 
drafts and ratifies a final Constitution. !ti the final Constitution the reference to 'disability' 
c:;----
117lbid at 1689 
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could very well be left out, and Professor Cameron mentions that it was surprising that it 
was included in the interim Constitution in the first place. 118 
7.5 POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS AND POSSIBLE DISCR.Il\1INATION 
How would the solutions suggested in chapter 6 fare when measured against the 
~ Constitution? The Broker solution utilises existing products which do not require life cover 
Jand therefore would not require HIV testing. As such it would not fall foul of the 
I 
Constitution. 
High risk pools are mandatory, and the state compels insurers to institute them. They 
would, therefore, be compelled to undertake a burden not shared to any great extent by 
any other sector of the population. Would this entitle them to relief under the 
Constitution? Section 7(3) entitles juristic persons to the rights contained in chapter 3, but 
only where the extent and nature of the rights so permit. A juristic person would probably 
be entitled to the rights of economic activity, labour relations, assembly, association, access 
to court, access to information, property and administrative justice, but not to political 
rights, citizens' rights and probably not to the right to equality. This is because under the 
equality clause the categories mentioned pertain to human traits or conditions. So whilst 
an insurer may not seek relief under s 8, it could argue that being compelled to institute a 
high risk pool infringes its right to freely engage in economic acti."1.ty[ s26(1)]. The state, 
/ on the other hand, can assert that by limiting an insurer's right to free economic acti"1ty it is 
1 
promoting the protection and improvement of the quality of life ( of dependants of persons 
with AIDS), or equal opportunity for all (equal access to.life insurance)[s 26(2)]. A 
shareholder or policyholder may, however, also approach the court for relief on the basis 
I I8cameron (n 115 at 2) 
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N that the state, by compelling insurers to institute high risk pools, indirectly discriminates 
l / \against shareholders or policyholders[ s 8(2)]. This solution, therefore, is not free from 
discrimination. 
Open enrohnent periods work best with state or public insurers. However, if the insurance 
industry were compelled to institute these open enrohnent periods, the same arguments 
used for high risk pools would be applicable here. A shareholder or policyholder could 
also obtain relief by first asking the court to hold thats 33(4) be applicable to the insurer, 
and once this is successful, use s 8(2) and assert that the insurer indirectly discriminates 
against shareholder(s) or policyholder(s). 
The public solution would be imposed by the state. The public insurance scheme would 
discriminate on the basis that it would only accept applicants who were rejected by private 
insurers. Can an aggrieved citizen claim that this discrimination is unfair, and ask the court 
for appropriate relief? I am of the opinion that such a citizen will not be successfui as the 
state is required to treat equals as equals and unequals as unequal. The state makes 
available and funds various public schemes, but limits these to particular sections or sectors 
of the public, such as unemployment insurance, a public scheme to which a large number 
of people contribute but only certain people obtain benefits from . 
• 
The combined/mixed solution combines both the insurance industry and the public sector. 
No one party is overly burdened in terms of costs, there is no HIV testing and everyone is 
accepted into the scheme subject to certain benefit limitations. As there wouJd be l!Q_ 
testing, there cannot be said to be any discrimination agamst any particular minority or 
sector of the population. Whilst the insurance industry will initially cany the cost, the 
\\ public scheme will re-imburse the industry for any deaths relating to the ban on testing, so 
shareholders and policyholders will have no reason to claim discrimination. The state will 
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also ensure equal opportunity for all as well as be seen to be promoting the protection and 
improvement of the quality of life. The life cover/ benefit limitation will not be 
discriminatory as it will be tailored to each individual applicant's need. Those applicants 
seeking cover above their limit will have to undergo an I-llV test, and as this will exceed the 
norm, it will not be discriminatory. This solution, therefore, has the added advantage of 




AIDS is an equal opportunity disease. It does not distinguish between male or female, rich 
or poor, black or white, nor does it stop to enquire about a victim's sexual orientation 
before it infects him or her. Instead of competing parties attempting to gain the advantage 
for their particular position, it would be advisable for these competing parties to sit down 
and negotiate an imaginative response/solution to the problem. The combined solution is 
not perfect, but it goes a long way in addressing the concerns and fears of the parties. It 
will also ensure that the cost of the AIDS insurance is spread evenly among all parties, 
instead of being placed on a particular segment of society. There is no right to life 
insurance in the present Constitution, but given the fact that a life insurance policy is a 
11 financial necessity, 119 the final Constitution may well make prowion, for a right. 
}Life insurance by its nature is a long-term business. Insurers should start planning now for ., I the future. It would be a double tragedy if the black population, who bore the brunt of 
I discrimination under apartheid and who are the most affected by AIDS , find themselves 
i 
I 
; ( further discriminated against when they require life insurance for mortgage protection and 
:, ,are unable to obtain insurance. 
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